



Enactivism and the problems of self-knowledge

Anita PACHOLIK-ŻUROMSKA

Nicolaus Copernicus University,
Institute of Philosophy
Department of Epistemology and Methodology of Science
Torun, Poland

In this presentation I want to consider the consequences of enactivism for the question of self-knowledge. The definition of self-knowledge claims, that a thinker has the knowledge about the intentional contents of his attitudes without first checking their environmental relations. This kind of knowledge, called *de se*, could be defined as a subject's knowledge about his own mental states. This knowledge is infallible, direct and authoritative, which means that a subject has privileged access to his own mental states. The main thesis of enactivism claims, that organisms and the human mind organize themselves by interacting with their environment. The problem is, that the relation between a thinker and an environment is not complete because the environment is external to him. That means, that the content of thinkers attitudes can be in part determined by factors, which are unknown to the thinker. So the main question is: Could the self-knowledge be still authoritative from the enactivistic point of view?

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